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SOLICITATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LITIGATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
DONALD P. SIMET*
The United States Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear two
different cases concerning lawyer solicitation.1 This action follows close-
ly the Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar,2 which recognized that
attorneys have at least a limited right to advertise under the first amend-
ment. The first of these cases, In re Smith,' raises the question of
whether a non-profit organization, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), contrary to South Carolina's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity,' may solicit cases that involve substantial civil liberties questions
when the organization seeks a fee for its legal services. The second case,
Ohio State Bar Association v. Ohralik,5 raises the issue of whether an
individual attorney, contrary to Ohio's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity,6 may engage in in-person client solicitation in order to obtain a fee
for his services. Because both cases not only involve significant first
amendment free speech questions but also have important impacts on the
practice of law and the public availability of legal services, there is a
compelling need to examine the problems they raise.
After presenting the solicitation cases, the article will analyze the
nearest precedents bearing on each. In re Smith will be examined in light
* Assistant Professor, School of Management, State University of New York at
Buffalo. B.S., 1958, Canisius College; J.D., 1964, School of Law, State University of New
York at Buffalo; Ph.D., 1974, University of Wisconsin.
1. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217,357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), prob.
juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977); In re Smith, - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris.
noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977). For a general discussion of attorneys' first amendment rights,
including solicitation, see Note, Attorneys' Rights Under the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility: Free Speech, Right to Know, and Freedom of Association, 1977 WASH.
U.L.Q. 687.
2. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3. - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
4. SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) &
(c).
5. 48 Ohio St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d1097(1976),prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
6. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A).
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of NAACP v. Button,7 which also involved solicitation by a non-profit
organization of cases that raised substantial constitutional issues. The
NAACP, however, is not an organization wholly devoted to litigation nor
does it accept fees for its legal service. The in-person solicitation of
clients by a private attorney seeking his own financial gain raises prob-
lems that parallel much of the Court's reasoning in the recent pharmacist
and attorney advertising cases, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.8 and Bates v. State Bar.9 The
Ohralik case, therefore will be examined in light of these decisions and
the special difficulties presented by in-person solicitation.
I. THE SOLICITATION CASES TO BE REVIEWED BY THE COURT
In re Smith"0 involved an alleged violation of a South Carolina Code
of Professional Responsibility provision that permits an attorney to solicit
clients on behalf of a non-profit organization
only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the renidition of the service requires the
allowance of such legal service activities, and only if the following
conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organizations do not include the
rendition of legal service.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal service by the lawyer."
Ms. Smith, a member of the South Carolina Bar, acting upon the
invitation of the South Carolina Council on Human Relations, arranged a
meeting with several women who had been surgically sterilized. At the
meeting she advised them that they could bring an action to recover
damages from the physician who performed the operations. Soon thereaf-
ter Ms. Smith sent a letter to Mrs. Williams, one of the women who had
attended the meeting, stating that the ACLU would like to bring such an
action on Mrs. Williams' behalf. Apparently, Ms. Smith wanted Mrs.
Williams to join in a class action filed in the name of Jane Doe and others
similarly situated, which alleged that the sterilization operations violated
7. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
9. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
10. - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
11. SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) &
(c), quoted in In re Smith, - S.C. at -, 233 S.E.2d at 304-05.
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various constitutional guarantees and demanded that the physician
concerned be enjoined and held liable for damages. 12
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
solicitation conditions imposed on non-profit organizations. The court
examined the opinion of the disciplinary panel, which had originally
heard the respondent's case, and concluded that the opinion correctly
disposed of the issues raised on appeal. ' 3 The panel noted that, with the
possible exception of NAACP v. Button,'4 the United States Supreme
Court decisions upholding client solicitation by non-profit organizations
involved organizations not primarily concerned with providing legal
services. 5 The Button decision, moreover, "appears to characterize the
NAACP as a political, rather than legal organization, and depicts litiga-
tion as an adjunct to the overriding political aims of the organization."' 6
The ACLU, on the other hand, is a legal services organization which
accepts attorney fees from its clients. The collection of these fees vio-
lated the prohibition against "deriving a financial benefit"" from any
case solicited by a non-profit organization.
Ohio State Bar Association v. Ohralik18 concerned an alleged viola-
tion of two disciplinary rules of Ohio's Code of Professional Responsi-
bility:
A lawyer shall not recommend employment. . . of himself. . . to a
non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer [and]
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice .... 19
Mr. Ohralik, a member of the Ohio Bar, after learning that Carol
McClintock and her passenger, Wanda Lou Holbert, were involved in an
automobile accident, visited Carol at the hospital where she was being
treated for injuries. There he discussed the merits of the potential legal
claim arising out of the accident and obtained consent to represent her.
12. - S.C. at -, 233 S.E.2d at 302.
13. Id. at -, 233 S.E.2d at 302, 305-06.
14. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
15. - S.C. at -, 233 S.E.2d at 305-06.
16. Id.
17. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
18. 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
19. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A),
quoted in Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 220, 357 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
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Later the respondent visited Wanda Lou Holbert at her house, advised
her that she had a substantial legal claim, and stated that he was prepared
to represent her. Wanda orally agreed to retain him.20 Subsequently, both
Carol and Wanda Lou sought to disengage Ohralik. 2'
The Ohio State Bar Association filed a complaint with the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline alleging that Ohralik's
conduct violated Ohio's Code of Professional Responsibility. At his
hearing, the respondent produced a tape recording of his conversation
with Wanda Lou Holbert which, he claimed, substantiated the existence
of a binding service contract. Ohralik had concealed the recorder during
the conversation. Although the tape demonstrated Wanda Lou's consent,
it also confirmed the respondent's solicitation. The board therefore found
Ohralik in violation of the Code.22
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the respondent claimed that the
rules banning in-person solicitation deprived him of his free speech right
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. In a
brief per curiam opinion, which did not explicitly discuss the constitu-
tional issues, the court agreed that the disciplinary rules had been vio-
latecand indefinitely suspended Ohralik from the practice of law. 23
II. SOLICITATION INVOLVING FEES BY A NON-PROFIT
LEGAL ORGANIZATION: NAACP v. BUTTON
The facts in NAACP v. Button24 are strikingly similar to those in In re
Smith.' An NAACP branch invited one of its staff attorneys to a
meeting of parents and children to explain the legal steps involved in
desegregating a school system. Printed forms authorizing NAACP attor-
neys to represent litigants in such actions were made available to those
persons willing to become plaintiffs. 26
The Court considered only whether a Virginia statute prohibiting
solicitation of clients violated the first amendment as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The provision banned solicitation by
an agent. . . for any person, partnership, corporation, organization or
association which employs, retains or compensates any attorney at law
20. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 217-18, 357 N.E.2d at 1097-98.
21. Id. at 219, 357 N.E.2d at 1098.
22. Id. at 218-19, 357 N.E.2d at 1098.
23. Id. at 220, 357 N.E.2d at 1099.
24. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
25. - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
26. 371 U.S. at 421, 422 & n.6.
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in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such person, part-
nership, corporation, organization or association is not a party and in
which it has no pecuniary right or liability .... 27
Justice Brennan's majority opinion initially rejected the assertion that
solicitation was not protected by the first amendment. Litigation as
employed by the NAACP, he reasoned, is a "means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment" 28 and "is thus a form of
political expression." 29 Even if the NAACP's conduct was unprotected,
however, Brennan concluded that the statute was overly broad:
Standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of
free expression. . . . Furthermore, the instant decree may be invalid
if it prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether
or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged
conduct. . . . These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanc-
tions.-0
Brennan also rejected Virginia's claim that the state's interest in
regulating professional activity justified the broad ban on solicitation.
Restrictions on free speech and assembly required a compelling state
interest. 31 Moreover, to emphasize that the decision did not rest entirely
on the overly broad scope of Virginia's ban, Brennan reiterated:
We conclude that although the petitioner has amply shown that its
activities fall within the First Amendment's protections, the State has
failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of
substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify
the broad prohibitions which it has imposed. Nothing that this record
shows as to the nature and purpose of NAACP activities permits an
inference of any injurious intervention in or control of litigation which
would constitutionally authorize the application of Chapter 33 to those
activities. A fortiori, nothing in this record justifies the breadth and
vagueness of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decree.
32
As noted above, the Smith court distinguished Button as a case that
involved solicitation by a political rather than legal organization. This
distinction seems specious. It is difficult to maintain that the Court in
27. Id. at 424 n.7 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 429.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 432-33 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 439.
32. Id. at 444.
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Button did not regard litigation as a primary function of the NAACP. As
Justice Brennan noted, the NAACP "devotes much of its funds and
energies to an extensive program of assisting certain kinds of litigation on
behalf of its declared purposes.""
Nevertheless, Button did not turn on the primary function of the
organization being regulated (even if this could be unambiguously iden-
tified). Rather, the Court considered whether the NAACP's solicitation
activities, regardless of their primary function, were protected speech. In
deciding that issue, Justice Brennan held that litigation solicited by an
organization or its agent in order to achieve lawful and, indeed, constitu-
tional objectives is "a form of political expression." 3 4 In re Smith35
concerns the same kind of litigation; the ACLU solicited a client in order
to assert various constitutional guarantees which it believed were denied
to her. To prohibit the ACLU from engaging in such activities would
produce the same chilling effect on the assertion of legal and constitu-
tional guarantees which the Court found objectionable in Button.
Under the Button analysis, it is also difficult to find any compelling
state interest in the regulation of the ACLU's activities. The Smith court
failed to explicitly identify such an interest. Furthermore, although the
acceptance of a fee arguably distinguishes the activities of the ACLU
from those of the NAACP in Button, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's description of the use of these fees negates the distinction: The
" 'fees go into its central fund and are used among other things to pay
costs and salaries and expenses of staff attorneys.' "'36 If these fees are
used to pay for the salaries of those who assert the constitutional rights of
the clients solicited by the organization, they constitute a means of
litigating lawful and constitutional objectives and are "thus a form of
[protected] political expression." 37 Furthermore, as the opinion in In re
Smith indicates, there is no disagreement over the objectives sought by
the ACLU as a legal organization. " 'The evidence presented indicated
that the ACLU has only entered cases in which substantial civil liberties
questions are involved . . "38
33. Id. at 419-20.
34. Id. at 429.
35. In re Smith, - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
36. Id. at -, 233 S.E.2d at 305.
37. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429.
38. - S.C. at-, 233 S.E.2d at 303.
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III. IN-PERSON SOLICITATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEY
FOR HIS PRIVATE GAIN
The immediate predecessor to Bates v. State Bar39 was Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,4
decided by the Supreme Court in 1976. The issue in Virginia Pharmacy
was whether a state statute banning the advertising of prescription drugs
violated the first amendment. The action was brought by an individual
consumer and two consumer organizations.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, first rejected petitioner's
argument that prescription price advertising constituted commercial
speech which under Valentine v. Chrestensen4' was not protected by the
first amendment. The Court noted that the commercial speech doctrine
had been greatly weakened by subsequent decisions 42 and thus applied
the traditional balancing test to determine the advertisement's constitu-
tionality. 43
Substantial individual and societal interests weighed against the valid-
ity of the advertising ban. Clearly, the consumer has an interest in
receiving price information, especially because the lack of such informa-
tion falls hardest on "the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged."4
Society in general also has an interest in the free flow of this information:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is indispensable.45
The effects of advertising on the pharmaceutical profession were
insufficient to counterbalance these individual and societal interests.
Justice Blackmun observed that providing prescription drugs does not
involve a high degree of professional skill. Because about ninety-five
percent of all prescriptions are filled from compounds prepared by
39. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
40. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
41. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
42. 425 U.S. at 762. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
43. 425 U.S. at 762-70.
44. Id. at 763.
45. Id. at 765.
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pharrfiaceutical manufacturers, druggists could not claim that they fre-
quently used their clinical skill in compounding drugs. Pharmacists must
therefore exercise their professional skills by consulting with physicians
as to what should be prescribed, monitoring the quantity and kinds of
drugs consumed by regular customers, and insuring that the stocks used
to fill prescriptions have retained their quality. This reduction in profes-
sional service diminished the justification for maintaining a high price
level for prescription drugs through a ban on price advertising. 46
Blackmun also argued that any decline in the level of professional
service caused by lower prices could be effectively prevented by state
regulation: "Surely any pharmacist guilty of professional dereliction
• . . will promptly lose his license." 47 In addition, the advertising ban
does not prevent "the cutting of corners by the pharmacist who is so
inclined. That pharmacist is likely to cut corners in any event., ,48
Finally, Blackmun rejected the argument that consumers lack the
capacity to choose between professional and low priced service. As he
states:
[A]n alternative to this highly paternalistic approach . . . is to
assume . . . that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them. If they are truly open, nothing prevents the 'professional'
pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior product,
and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescrip-
tion drug retailer. But the choice among these alternative ap-
proaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for US. 49
In striking down Virginia's total ban on advertising prescription
drugsj' Blackmun noted that time, place, and manner restrictions on
advertising that "serve a significant governmental interest" 5' and "leave
open . . . alternative channels for communication" 52 would remain
permissible. False and misleading advertising would certainly be subject
46. Id. at 752, 766-68.
47. Id. at 768-69.
48. Id. at 769.
49. Id. at 770.
50. Id.




SOLICITATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
to control. In addition, transactions which are themselves illegal could
not be advertised.53 Finally, the Court noted that "the special problems
of the electronic broadcast media are. . . not [involved] in this case."5 4
The reasoning that upheld advertising in Virginia Pharmacy also
applies to in-person solicitation of clients by an attorney seeking financial
gain. If the advertiser's interest in attracting clients is legitimate under
the first amendment, so is the solicitor's interest in obtaining clients. If
consumers, either individually or collectively, benefit from advertising
information because they can make a more informed decision, they also
benefit from an explanation of their legal rights by in-person solicitation.
Indeed, while the advertiser and solicitor both have the same objective of
attracting clients, the solicitor who reviews the merits of a particular
claim with a potential client is, if anything, providing him with more
information upon which to make an intelligent judgment.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that individual solicitation creates less
price competition than mass advertising, and thus produces less
consumer benefit. Mass advertising lowers prices through competition
and the expectation of increased business. The consumer can easily
compare published prices. Individual solicitation, on the other hand,
does not reach a mass market at a reduced per unit cost. Rather, it places
a premium on the consumer's knowledge of prices and his willingness to
bargain. Although this knowledge may be enhanced by multiple solicita-
tion, any concomitant price reduction would fall short of that produced
by mass advertising.
It can also be argued that individual solicitation presents greater
opportunities for "overreaching" by persistent attorneys. This fear,
however, does not justify the imposition of a total ban. Extreme behavior
such as overreaching is more properly controlled by specific regulation
that places less severe burdens on constitutionally protected speech.
Although the factors favoring the free dissemination of service and
price information in Virginia Pharmacy seem to apply with much the
same force to in-person solicitation, we must consider whether there are
special characteristics of the legal profession that outweigh the advan-
tages of solicitation. Bates v. State Bar55 specifically discussed the
characteristics of the legal profession raised as justifications for limiting
the dissemination of service and price information.
53. Id. at 771-72.
54. Id. at 773.
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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Bates concerned the advertisement of attorney's fees charged for
uncontested divorces, separations, adoptions, uncontested personal
bankruptcies, and name changes. Under a disciplinary rule governing
attorney ethics, 6 Arizona prohibited the advertising of legal services.
Justice Blackmun again spoke for the Court. After setting forth the
individual and societal interests that weighed so heavily in favor of
advertising in Virginia Pharmacy,5 7 Blackmun examined the character-
istics of the legal profession offered to justify the advertising ban. First,
the state bar argued that legal services involve work whose content and
quality must be tailored to the individual case. It would be difficult,
therefore, to inform clients accurately about needed services without
examining their cases. Thus, advertising would be inherently misleading.
Blackmun admitted that "many services performed by attorneys are
indeed unique, [and] it is doubtful that any attorney would or could
advertise fixed prices for services of that type. '"58 Nevertheless, the
services advertised in the instant case were routine ones, the "only
services which lend themselves to advertising." 5 9 In addition, Blackmun
noted that "[a]lthough the client may not know the detail involved in
performing the task, he no doubt is able to identify the service he desires
at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself. "60
Closely related to the nature of the work is the problem of informing
the client about the level of skill required to perform it. Blackmun's
answer is familiar: If clients are naive about the importance of obtaining
a skilled performance, it is the duty of the bar, not the individual
advertiser, to inform them of this. While advertising is not a perfect
medium for conveying all relevant information, it is better that clients be
given some information about the work which they can understand (the
price of routine services) rather than none. 61
The respondents also argued that advertising would adversely affect
the quality of legal services rendered. Justice Blackmun replied that
"[a]n attorney who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the
rule on advertising." 62 He noted, however, that as practitioners
56. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101 (B), adopted by ARIZ.
Sup. CT. R. 29 (a).
57. 433 U.S. at 363-66.
58. Id. at 372.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 374.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 378.
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specialize more in the delivery of a limited number of routine services,
the quality of these services may increase.
Respondents argued that two other characteristics of the legal profes-
sion supported the ban: the lawyer's orientation toward service and the
profession's respected image. Conceivably, advertising and the emphasis
on profit may impair a lawyer's orientation toward service to others.
Blackmun dismissed this argument, noting that it rested on the "self-
deception" 6 3 that lawyers must regard themselves as not involved in
earning a livelihood in order to maintain a service orientation. He added:
''rare is the client . . . who enlists the aid of an attorney with the
expectation that his services will be rendered free of charge. "64 Regard-
ing the community's image of the lawyer, Blackmun referred to "studies
[which] reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even when they
perceive a need because of the feared price of services. "65
The Arizona Bar Association further claimed that advertising would
stir up litigation and create societal conflicts. Blackmun, however, was
more impressed with the American Bar Association's estimate that" 'the
middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately
by the legal profession.' "66 Advertising might encourage these individu-
als to consult attorneys by reducing their fear concerning the cost of
services and by informing them about who was offering the needed
services .67
Despite the argument's failure in Virginia Pharmacy, respondents in
Bates claimed that advertising would increase the cost of services, thus
raising a barrier to entry into the profession which would result in a loss
of competiton. Blackmun rejected this, citing studies of other professions
and skilled occupations that showed advertising substantially reduced
prices.68 In addition, the entry barrier into the legal profession was not
based on cost but rather on the time required to develop the contacts and
63. Id. at 368.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 370, (citing Report of the ABA Special Committee on Availability of Legal
Services, in ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, REVISED HANDBOOK
ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 25 (1972)); ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES, COMPILATION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES (1973).
66. 433 U.S. at 376.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 377 & n.34. Justice Blackmun conceded that the effect of advertising on the
price of professional services had not yet been demonstrated. He noted, however, the
favorable effect advertising had had on retail product prices. See J. CADY, RESTRICTED
ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); Benham, The Effect
of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 337 (1972).
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reputation needed to attract clients. Advertising, by lessening this bar-
rier, would actually result in an increase in competition. 69
Finally, respondents argued that if the ban were lifted the difficulty of
policing abuses such as misleading advertising and distorted service or
price claims would be great.70 In response, Blackmun claimed that most
lawyers could be trusted to "abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the
integrity and honor of their profession.''71 The self-interest of these
practitioners could be counted on "to assist in weeding out those few
who abuse their trust." 72
Many of the arguments weighing against advertising in the legal
profession because of its peculiar characteristics actually favor in-person
solicitation. Because legal services often must be tailored to the individu-
al case, Justice Blackmun limited advertising to routine or, at least,
specifically described services. 73 In-person consultation provided in the
course of solicitation does not require such a limitation, because it allows
an attorney to discuss the particular needs of a specific case. Permitting
the advertisement of routine services, on the other hand, leaves the
consumer uninformed as to many other services available to him.
It is unrealistic to expect the bar to bear the burden of informing clients
about the importance of selecting an attorney with appropriate skills. In-
person consultation, however, would at least afford the consumer an
opportunity to inquire about and judge the attorney's competence. The
fact that the prospective client should have this opportunity, of course,
does not mean that the attorney should be permitted to make false or
misleading claims about his skill.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's reply to the charge that advertising
will affect the service orientation of the bar74 applies with equal force to
in-person solicitation. In both situations, the objection merely reveals the
fact that attorneys ordinarily profit from their services. Similarly, Justice
Blackmun's argument concerning the professional image of attorneys 75
applies as easily to in-person solicitation as to advertising. Either practice
can reduce the prospective client's fears about the cost of services and
can, thereby, decrease the number of individuals who forego needed
legal assistance.
69. 433 U.S. at 377-78.
70. Id. at 379.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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Although solicitation does not appear to threaten the quality and
selflessness of legal service any more than advertising does, its effect on
another traditional characteristic of the profession, self-regulation, may
be more troublesome. Advertising by its nature is highly visible, not only
to consumers, but also to other members of the profession as well as to
reviewing bar associations. Solicitation, on the other hand, is private;
exposing its abuses depends more upon the perceptions of unsophis-
ticated clients. Indeed, the Court's major reservations concerning adver-
tising in Bates centered upon the problem of client deception. As Justice
Blackmun stated:
In fact, because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unim-
portant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in
legal advertising. . . . In sum, we recognize that many of the
problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and non-
deceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and we expect that the
bar will have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by
attorneys flows both freely and cleanly. 76
If the problem is client deception, however, then it is this area of
solicitation or advertising that should be regulated.
The Task Force on Lawyer Advertising in its recent report to the Board
of Governors of the American Bar Association has recommended, as one
of two alternatives, a proposal on solicitation that specifically addresses
this problem:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layperson
. . . shall not accept employment resulting from that advice
if:
(1) The advice embodies or implies a statement or claim
that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive...
or
(2) The advice involves the use by the lawyer of coercion,
duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, unwarranted
promises or benefits, overpersuasion, overreaching, or
vexatious or harassing conduct.77
The Task Force's proposal adds two dimensions. First, it clearly
recognizes that clients should be free to enter into agreements to retain an
attorney arising out of in-person solicitations. Second, it establishes
76. 433 U.S. at 384.
77. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-104 (Aug. 1977 Amendment,
Proposal B), 46 U.S.L.W. 12 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
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certain guidelines for attorneys when giving unsolicited advice.
Nevertheless, some of the language of the Task Force's proposal, such as
the terms "overpersuasion" and "overreaching," are vague and may not
put an attorney on notice as to what conduct is punishable. In this regard,
we need to re-examine Justice Blackmun's rejection of the vagueness or
overbreadth doctrines in "ordinary commercial" speech. 78
In Bates, Blackmun argued that advertisers would not be inhibited by
an overbroad prohibition because their self-interest was at stake. Further-
more, advertisers, as the providers of the service in question, could
determine what information was truthful. 79 These arguments are not as
persuasive when applied to solicitation. Although an attorney who gives
unsolicited advice would have the same self-interest motivation, rather
than being asked to judge the truthfulness of his speech, he is told to
evaluate whether his advice is "overpersuasion" or "overreaching."
Making this judgment does not depend upon facts known to the attorney
but rather upon a knowledge of the client's particular susceptibility and
the unguided judgments of those asked to try an attorney on such a
charge.
Moreover, it is doubtful that a vague ban on "overreaching" would be
an effective means of preventing only truly objectionable conduct. Nor is
it clear that such a prohibition would be administered in a way that would
reach clear abuses rather than merely conduct thought to lack good taste
and professional decorum.
In addition, vague prohibitions tend to discriminate against certain
segments of the bar. As Jerome Carlin has noted, the original ethical
canons on solicitation and advertising grew out of a conception of law
as practiced in small communities where the greater ease of knowing an
attorney either personally or by his reputation presumably made advertis-
ing and solicitation unnecessary. 80 This conception hardly squares with
the current practice of law in larger towns and cities. Nor does it take into
account the structure of the bar in most metropolitan areas: whereas large
firms enjoy the patronage of those clients who are most able to afford
legal services, many small firms and solo practitioners are engaged in a
highly competitive struggle to attract a limited number of clients whose
ability to afford legal services is quite modest. 81 Studies by Carlin as well
78. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977).
79. Id.
80. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 155-67 (1962).
81. Id. at 206-11.
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as Handler82 support the view that these economic pressures have con-
tributed substantially to past violations of the professional restrictions on
solicitation. Moreover, bar members who enjoy a more elite and secure
status and who are often called upon to judge such violations have not
always been sympathetic to the plight of the small firm and the solo
attorney. 83
Vague prohibitions against solicitation, therefore, do not fall equally
on all members of the bar. Instead, they create a trap for those who
compete for the least lucrative segment of the legal market; a trap which
is not only baited by practical necessity but which also is well concealed
by the vagueness of its boundaries.
Finally, any assessment of the balance to be struck between protecting
the free choice of the consumer and the free speech of an attorney in
soliciting clients must take into account the precision of the instrument
which attempts to strike this balance. Drafting clear regulations that will
place attorneys on notice as to what conduct is permissible is a small
price to pay to achieve a fair balance between the duties of an attorney
and the rights of legal consumers. Although vagueness and overbreadth
are judicial doctrines, they are first the product of imprecise and unin-
structive draftsmanship.
IV. CONCLUSION
In re Smith84 and Ohio State Bar Association v. Ohralik85 raise two
quite different problems for the Supreme Court: in-person solicitation by
an attorney for his own profit and solicitation by a nonprofit legal
organization which seeks attorney fees in litigation involving a substan-
tial question of civil liberties. An analysis of the ACLU's right to engage
in solicitation must consider the importance of the legal and constitution-
al freedoms which that organization seeks to voice. The acceptance of
attorney fees in such litigation is merely a means of allowing such
expression. Furthermore, the fact that the ACLU is a legal organization
that advocates the legal and constitutional rights of citizens requires,
rather than negates, the application of the Court's rationale in NAACP v.
Button 6 to the kind of solicitation engaged in by the ACLU.
82. J. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIs COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A
MIDDLESIZED CITY (1967).
83. J. CARLIN, supra note 80, at 173-84.
84. - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
85. 48 Ohio St. 2d 217,357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), prob. juris. noted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
86. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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The solicitation of a suit between private litigants by an attorney, for
his personal gain, does not raise the issue of freedom to express or litigate
important civil and constitutional guarantees. A balancing test that re-
quires only a reasonable governmental interest as a condition to the
speech regulation is more appropriate. Even under this less stringent
analysis, however, the reasoning in Bates v. State Bar 7 would seem to
require the Court to invalidate the ban against in-person solicitation.
Solicitation, like advertising, serves the interests of both the attorney
who is legitimately seeking his own gain and the consuming public who
can benefit from a detailed explanation of the merits of their specific
cases. The state's interest in preserving the quality, selflessness, and
esteemed image of legal services does not appear to be substantially
greater in the case of solicitation than it is in advertising. The only
interests that the state has in regulation are confined to the avoidance of
consumer deception and the maintenance of voluntary consumer deci-
sions. This interest can be served by drafting professional codes which
will inform the attorney of permissible conduct. Such an approach would
not injure the autonomy of consumer choice and, indeed, might give it
specific protection. In balancing the interests of the attorney and the
consumer in this area, the Court and the bar should take into account the
vagueness of the instrument or language by which the state attempts to
regulate "persuasion." Careful draftsmanship is a slight burden to bear,
especially where freedom of speech and honorable, life-long careers are
at stake.
87. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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